

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00 USIE-00

AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02

OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 MC-01 /080 W

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O P 082100Z NOV 74

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 607

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 0401

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: NEXT STEPS ON NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR MANPOWER

REF: A) USNATO 6097; B) USNATO 6883; C) USNATO 6203

1 US MBFR DEL NOTES THAT EXCELLENT WORK ON PART OF
USMISSION NATO AND AMEMBASSH BONN HAS NEARLY FULLY
TURNED AROUND FRG THINKING ON AIR MANPOWER NON-INCREASE
COMMITMENT, AND HAS SUBSUBSTANTIALLY NARROWED DISAGREEMENT
IN SPC ON SPECIFICS OF GUIDANCE TO AD HOC GROUP.

WE WOULD LIKE TO STRESS NEED FOR AD HOC GROUP TO
RECEIVE GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT AT LATEST BY NOVEM-
BER 15 FOR USE IN INFORMAL ON NOVEMBER 19 SO THAT
ALLIES WILL NOT HAVE TO SURRENDER NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE

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TO EAST. TO THIS END, WE BELIEVE THE MOVEMENT SO FAR DEMONSTRATED BY FRG SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED AND SUSTAINED AND THAT WE SHOULD AIM FOR A REASONABLE COMPROMISE BETWEEN CURRENT US AND UK VIEWS AND THE FRG POSITION.

2 AS CLEARLY DESCRIBED IN USNATO REFTELS, THE REMAINING ISSUE -- AND IT IS NOT A LARGE ONE COMPARED TO THOSE ALREADY SOLVED -- IS HOW TO EXPRESS TO THE EAST ALLIED READINESS TO LIMIT AIR MANPOWER WITHOUT IMPLYING THAT SEPARATE CEILINGS ON WESTERN GROUND AND AIR FORCES MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST.

3. WE CONCUR WITH USNATO THAT, AMONG THE FOUR OPTIONS IN REF (C), OPTION ONE OR OPTION TWO WOULD ADEQUATELY MEET SPECIFIC US INTERESTS AT THIS POINT IN TIME. THERE IS ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS: JUST AS WE WISH TO AVOID AT THIS TIME ANY APPARENT COMMITMENT TO AIR FORCE SUB-CEILINGS, IT IS ALSO DESIRABLE TO AVOID THE IMPLICATION THAT ANY COMMITMENT OFFERED FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES IS OF UNLIMITED DURATION. A COMMITMENT UNDERTAKEN IN A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CONTEXT MIGHT CONTINUE IN EFFECT INDEFINITELY UNTIL A PHASE I AGREEMENT WITHDRAWAL CLAUSE WERE INVOKED.

4. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE INTENSITY OF THE FRG POSITION, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT NEITHER OPTION ONE NOR OPTION TWO AS PRESENTLY FORMULATED COULD SUFFICIENTLY ACCOMMODATE FRG CONCERNS TO BRING TIMELY SPC AGREEMENT. THEREFORE, WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVES BE CONSIDERED FOR POSSIBLE INTRODUCTION INTO SPC DISCUSSION.

5. THE FIRST POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE SOMETHING ON THE FOLLOWING LINES: BEGIN QUOTE: ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE AUTHORIZED TO SUGGEST TO THE EAST THAT THE ALLIES ARE WILLING TO CONSIDER A RECIPROCAL COMMITMENT IN CONNECTION WITH A PHASE I AGREEMENT THAT, IN ADDITION TO AN OVERALL CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BETWEEN THE PHASES, THE ALLIES WOULD ALSO BE WILLING TO PUT AN UPPER LIMIT ON
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ALL MANPOWER IN THE AREA: NEITHER SIDE WOULD EXCEED THE AGGREGATE TOTAL FORMED BY ADDING AIR FORCE MANPOWER TO THE OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER LEVEL FOR EACH SIDE WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM PHASE I REDUCTIONS. IF ASKED, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS COULD SAY A SATISFACTORY PHASE II AGREEMENT WOULD SUPERSEDE AND SUBSUME THESE COMMITMENTS. END QUOTE.

6. THE EFFECT OF THIS FORMULATION WOULD BE TO IMPOSE UNEQUAL OVERALL CEILINGS ON TOTAL MANPOWER IN THE AREA. THE AGREED LEVELS OF GROUND MANPOWER COULD NOT BE EXCEEDED, BUT AIR FORCE MANPOWER, NOT BEING SPECIFICALLY LIMITED WITHIN THE TOTAL, COULD INCREASE TO FILL THE GAP IF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER FELL BELOW THE PRESCRIBED CEILING. WE ASSUME THIS IS ONE OF THE INTERESTS WASHINGTON AGENCIES HAVE IN MIND. AT THE SAME TIME, THE FORMULATION SHOULD MEET THE GERMAN DESIRE TO KEEP AIR FORCE MANPOWER SEPARATE FROM GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TO TREAT IT DIFFERENTLY. ANOTHER VERSION OF THE SAME CONCEPT WOULD BE AS FOLLOWS:

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AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCUER

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 MBFR VIENNA 401

FROM US REP MBFR

BEGIN QUOTE: ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ARE AUTHORIZED TO SUGGEST TO THEIR WARSAW PACT COLLEAGUES THAT AN UPPER LIMIT COULD BE PLACED ON AGGREGATE GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE, THOUGH ONLY GROUND FORCES

WOULD BE REDUCED. THIS UPPER LIMIT WOULD BE LIMITED
IN DURATION TO FIVE YEARS AND WOULD BE SUPERSEDED BY
A PHASE II AGREEMENT. END QUOTE.

7. IF FORMULATIONS ON THESE LINES STILL PROVED UNACCEPTABLE
TO THE FRG, THE FOLLOWING ALTERNATIVE MIGHT BE CON-
SIDERED: BEGIN QUOTE: THE ALLIES WOULD BE WILLING ON
A RECIPROCAL BASIS TO LIMIT AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE
AREA OF REDUCTION FOR THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PHASES.
IF ASKED, ALLIED REPS COULD SAY THAT, IN THE EVENT OF
A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT INCLUDING AGREEMENT ON THE
CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCES, THE ALLIES
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WOULD ALSO BE READY TO LIMIT AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN A
PHASE II AGREEMENT. END QUOTE.

8. THIS FORMULA DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT
OF ANY KIND WITH THE EAST BUT IS ONLY A STATEMENT
INDICATING A POSSIBLE FUTURE MOVE. IT DOES NOT INDICATE
IN ANY WAY WHAT THE FORM OF THE ALLIED COMMITMENT WOULD
BE. IT IS WHOLLY NEUTRAL AS TO WHETHER THAT COMMITMENT
WOULD BE PART OF OR SEPARATE FROM LIMITS ON GROUND FORCE
MANPOWER BETWEEN THE PHASES OR WHETHER THERE WOULD BE
OR WOULD NOT BE A SEPARATE LIMIT ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER
IN A PHASE II AGREEMENT. NOR WOULD USE OF THE SUGGESTED
FORMULA, BACKED BY STATEMENTS ALREADY AGREED BY THE
ALLIES THAT THE FORM OF ANY COMMITMENT WILL BE CONSIDERED
SEPARATELY LATER, PERMIT ANY INTERPRETATION
THAT THE ALLIES HAD COMMITTED THEMSELVES IN ANY WAY TO
A SUB-CEILING ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER. TO PROTECT STILL
FURTHER AGAINST THIS LIMITED POSSIBILITY, THE ALLIED
NEGOTIATORS COULD ALSO BE AUTHORIZED, IF ASKED
BY THE EAST WHETHER THE ALLIES WERE CONTEMPLATING
SUB-CEILINGS ON AIR AND GROUND FORCES, TO REPLY ALONG THE
LINE THAT THE ALLIES WERE INCLINED AGAINST THIS POSSIBILITY,
BUT THAT THE ISSUE WAS STILL UNDER STUDY, AND THAT IT WAS
PREMATURE AT THIS POINT TO GET INTO QUESTIONS OF FORM
OR DETAIL.

9. WE WOULD REQUEST THAT THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION IN
VIENNA AND THE PROBABLE COURSE OF ALLIED DIALOGUE WITH
THE EAST BE KEPT IN MIND AS THIS ISSUE COMES TO A FINAL
RESOLUTION. IT IS THE WESTERN OBJECTIVE AT THIS STATE
TO DRIVE THE DISCUSSION BACK TO THE COMMON CEILING ON
GROUND FORCE MANPOWER THROUGH THE ARGUMENT: (A) AIR
FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA IS NEARLY EQUAL; (B) WHILE
IT WOULD BE PERFECTLY LOGICAL TO LIMIT ONLY GROUND FORCE
MANPOWER, THE WEST IS WILLING TO PLACE SOME LIMIT ON AIR
FORCE MANPOWER OF THE EAST WILL MOVE TOWARD THE COMMON CEILING

ON GROUND FORCES; AND (C) IF AIR FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA IS NEARLY EQUAL AND IS ALSO PLACED UNDER SOME UPPER LIMIT, THEN THE GROUND FORCE DISPARITY REMAINS AS THE PROBLEM TO BE DEALT WITH. THE FORMULATION USED WITH THE EAST TO PUT ACROSS THIS MESSAGE SHOULD
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BE AS STRAIGHT-FORWARD AS POSSIBLE. NEARLY ALL THE VARIATIONS PROPOSED THUS FAR HAVE THE DISADVANTAGE THAT THEIR COMPLEXITY WOULD RAISE FOR DISCUSSION NOW THE VERY ISSUE OF SUB-CEILINGS WE WOULD LIKE TO AVOID, WHEREAS IT SHOULD OTHERWISE BE RELATIVELY EASY TO AVOID SUCH DISCUSSIONS OR TO DEAL WITH THE TOPIC IF IT NEVERTHELESS COMES UP.

10. AS NOTED ABOVE, WE ARE INTERESTED IN QUICK ACTION FROM THE ALLIES TO MEET TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS IN VIENNA. WHEN THE TWO PROBLEMS THE SPC IS NOW DEALING WITH ARE CONTRASTED, ON THE ONE HAND GERMAN REFUSAL AT THIS TIME TO GET INVOLVED IN REDUCTION OF AIR FORCE MANPOWER AND ON THE OTHER HAND, OUR OWN DESIRE TO AVOID A STEP WHICH COULD RESULT IN SOME OBLIGATION TO UNDERTAKE A SUB-CEILING ON AIR FORCE MANPOWER, IT BECOMES APPARENT THAT THE TWO PROBLEMS ARE DIFFERENT KINDS FOR THAT REASON THEY SHOULD NOT, WE BELIEVE, BE EQUATED IN IMPORTANCE. THE GERMAN REFUSAL THUS FAR TO AGREE TO REDUCE AIR FORCE MANPOWER INVOLVES AN OBJECTIVELY IMPORTANT ISSUE WHERE THE GERMANS HAVE TENACIOUSLY MAINTAINED POSITION OF PRINCIPLE. THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME INADVERTENT WESTERN COMMITMENT TO SUB-CEILINGS ON GROUND AND AIR FORCES IS AT THE PRESENT STAGE A PURELY TACTICAL PROBLEM, WHERE, IF THE UNDESIRE SHOULD IN FACT ARISE, IT CAN READILY BECOUNTERED BY A STATEMENT THAT THIS IS NOT THE WESTERN INTENTION. THIS IS WHY, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, WE FAVOR MOVING TOWARDS THE GERMAN POSITION IF BY DOING SO WE CAN GAIN RAPID ALLIED AGREEMENT ON GUIDANCE TO THE AD HOC GROUP. RESOR

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